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Intactness Verification in Anonymous RFID Systems

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Anonymous **RFID**



unknown tag identifiers (IDs)

Anonymous RFID Missing Tag Detection



unknown tag identifiers (IDs) any missing tags?



















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












But more challenging without known tag IDs



Solution Goals


- Anonymity Preservation
- Deterministic Detection


Fast Detection

Design Choices

- Anonymity Preservation isolate ID from protocol design
- Deterministic Detection
 verify tag absence via cardinality variation
- Fast Detection adapt DSSS technique for scalable protocol design


Fast & Deterministic Protocols






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Fast & Deterministic Protocols



 $(null, l_{s2})$ detect violated intactness of group l_{g2}^{u} !!

Fast & Deterministic Protocols Present Tags: T1, T2, T4, T6 Absent Tags: T3. T5 Cardiff Round 1: $f = n_{exp} = 6$, $n_{cur} = 0$ Round 2: $f = n_{exp} - n_{cur} = 4$ Anonymous T1 T2 **T**3 T4 **T5** T6 T2**T**3 T4 T5



cmp(intactness proof.

detect violated intactness of group $l_{g2}^{u}!!$

T4

 $(l_{\rm g} - l_{\rm g}^{\rm u})_4$

Motivation
 missing tags make
 tag cardinality < ID cardinality



Motivation
 missing tags make
 tag cardinality < ID cardinality



$$N_{\rm id} = 5$$

Motivation
 missing tags make
 tag cardinality < ID cardinality



$$N_{\text{tag}} = 4 - N_{\text{id}} = 5$$

cardinality difference

• Design


Count tags using slotted Aloha; Require tag responses short yet sufficient for the reader detecting singleton and collision;

Increase tag count by one upon singleton;

Detect violated intactness if tag cardinality < ID cardinality.


• Example

tag cardinality = 4 < ID cardinality = 6



tags may respond times

Fast & Deterministic Protocols



cmp(intactness proof, aggregated(null, l_{c2}) detect violated intactness of group l_{e2}^{u} !!

Motivation

Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (**DSSS**) technique can extract each participant's transmission from aggregated signal;

Recent advances implement DSSSenabled RFID.

• Motivation DSSS-enabled RFID comm. example:

	Spreading Code					0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0				
	Bipolar Notation					-1	1	-1	1	1	1	-1	-1				
Tag	Binary Data	Bit 1					Bit 0										
	Encoded Data	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
	Modulated Transmission	-1	1	-1	1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
Reader	Received Transmission	-1	1	-1	1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
	Normalized Inner Product [*]	1					-1										
		Bit 1				Bit 0											
	Bipolar Notation**					-1	1	-1	1	1	1	-1	-1				
	Spreading Code**					0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0				

*: Normalized inner product of received transmission and bipolar notation. Take the case of bit 1 for example, $\frac{(-1, 1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1) \cdot (-1, 1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1)}{(-1, 1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1)} = 1.$

**: The reader shares the same spreading code (and its bipolar notation) with the tag.

L-bit spreading code supports at most I tags for simultaneous transmission.

Design: pre-load each tag l-bit string
 Spreading code reuse

$$I = I_g + I_s$$

 I_g -bit group index
 I_s -bit *reusable* spreading code


support up to $2^{l_g} \times l_s$ tags

Design


Tag cardinality disguise $l_{g} = l_{g}^{u} + (l_{g} - l_{g}^{u})$ l_{g}^{u} -bit used group index support up to $2^{l_{g}^{u}} \times (l - l_{g})$ tags

eavesdropper's inferred tag cardinality: $2^{l_{g}^{u}} \times (l - l_{g}^{u})$

• Example




Fast & Deterministic Protocols





 $(null, l_{s2})$ detect violated intactness of group l_{g2}^{u} !!

Evaluation



CONCLUSION Fast & Deterministic Protocols





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leveraging adapted DSSS apply to DSSS-enabled tags faster than Cardiff

Thank You

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